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While guidelines on contact tracing (CT) after expo-
sure to certain infectious pathogens during air travel 
exist, no guidance documents are available on CT in 
response to potential exposure on public ground trans-
port. We reviewed scientific and non-scientific litera-
ture on transmission of airborne pathogens in public 
ground transport and on factors potentially influenc-
ing transmission.  We identified 32 relevant publica-
tions (15 scientific and 17 non-scientific). Most of the 
selected studies dealt with transmission of tubercu-
losis. However, the relation between travel duration, 
proximity to the index case and environmental factors, 
such as ventilation, on disease transmission in public 
ground transport is poorly understood. Considering 
the difficulty and probably limited effectiveness of 
CT in ground transport, our results suggest that only 
exceptional circumstances would justify CT. This con-
trasts with the high level of attention CT in air travel 
seems to receive in international regulations and rec-
ommendations. We question whether the indication 
for CT should be revisited after a risk–benefit assess-
ment that takes into account exposure in both ground 
and air transport.
Introduction 
Passengers using public transport may be at risk of 
infectious disease when they are exposed to infected 
passengers. Although guidelines on contact tracing 
(CT) after exposure to selected airborne infectious dis-
eases during air travel exist, no guidance documents 
are available on CT in response to potential exposure 
on public ground transport. Comparing the share of 
performance of air and ground travel respectively, the 
share of performance in public ground transport, such 
as buses/coaches, trams, metros and railways, of total 
transport performance of passengers in Europe in 2007 
was nearly twice as high (15.7%) as the share of air 
transport performance (8.8%) [1,2]. 
CT is defined as the identification of persons who may 
have been exposed to an infectious disease by an 
infected person and ensuring that they are aware of 
their exposure [3,4]. Although a recent literature review 
concentrated on published studies on tuberculosis (TB) 
transmission and recommendations for CT related to 
use of public transport [5], our review was carried out 
to analyse available publications on the evidence for 
transmission of any airborne infectious disease and on 
factors potentially influencing the risk of transmission 
in public ground conveyances. In addition to searching 





In May and June 2009, a review of scientific literature 
was carried out using Scopus, the largest abstract and 
citation database of peer-reviewed literature and high-
quality web sources [6,7]. It provides 100% MEDLINE 
coverage and contains more than 19,500 titles from 
5,000 publishers [8]. We searched the database for 
mentions of airborne transmission of infectious dis-
eases in public ground conveyances. We decided to 
perform the broadest possible search to include publi-
cations that might touch upon airborne disease trans-
mission and CT without necessarily being the paper’s 
main subject. Through the ‘all fields’ search, the fol-
lowing keywords were used: ‘railway’, ‘train’, ‘bus’, 
‘school bus’, ‘coach’, ‘tram’, ‘tramway’, ‘metro’, ‘sub-
way’, ‘underground’ and ‘tube’. We combined each 
means of public ground transport keyword with each 
of the following keywords (through ‘AND’): ‘infection’, 
‘infectious disease’, ‘transmission’, ‘contact tracing’, 
‘contact investigation’, ‘passenger tracing’, ‘tubercu-
losis’, ‘mycobacterium tuberculosis’, ‘TB’, ‘meningi-
tis’, ‘meningococcal disease’, ‘avian influenza’, ‘viral 
hemorrhagic fever’, ‘SARS’, ‘bubonic plague’, ‘rubella’, 
‘Lassa fever’, ‘measles’, ‘diphtheria’ and ‘smallpox’. In 
early December 2010, we updated the search using the 
identical keywords through the ‘all fields’ search. 
In a first step, search hits were screened by three 
reviewers: articles were selected if they contained 
information on airborne infectious disease transmis-
sion in public ground transport. English titles of all 
the selected publications were reviewed. If the title 
information was insufficient, the abstract was looked 
at to decide if the publication potentially met the selec-
tion criterion. The full text of each paper was obtained 
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when the selection criteria were met or when further 
information was needed to decide whether to include 
an article or not. When a reviewer was uncertain about 
making a decision at any of these steps, the other 
team members were consulted and a joint decision was 
taken. The selected articles were then reviewed for 
events of airborne infectious disease transmission in 
public ground transport. 
The following data were retrieved from each study: 
publication details (year, author(s), location), means 
of transport, diagnostic tests, number of infected per-
sons, number of tested contacts, transmission rate 
and number of cases with active disease. The publica-
tions were evaluated on factors potentially influencing 
transmission of infectious disease such as cumulative 
exposure related to repeated trips (e.g. on a school 
bus or commuter bus), duration of travel and environ-
mental factors (ventilation and air conditioning sys-
tems, seating position, distance to contact person). 
Bibliographies of potentially relevant publications 
were checked for additional studies.
Non-scientific literature
In February 2009, we performed a structured search 
for non-scientific literature through the search engines 
Google News, Google Scholar, GENIOS and World 
News. The search was limited to English and German 
publications. 
The search with GENIOS allowed a maximum of two 
keywords, the search of the World News archive was 
limited to the previous six months (September 2008–
February 2009), the World News advanced search was 
only searchable day by day, whereas the search with 
Google News archive and Google Scholar was limited 
to the previous five years (February 2004–February 
2009). Due to the differing time frame for searches 
provided by the engines we decided not to update the 
search. 
The keywords ‘bus’, ‘railway’ and ‘metro’ were com-
bined with ‘infectious disease’. The first 200 hits from 
each keyword combination with each search engine 
were screened to assess potential relevance to trans-
mission of infectious disease and CT in public ground 
transport. We reviewed title, abstracts or both of all 
retrieved publications. Potentially relevant articles 
were selected: inclusion criteria were events or cases 
of potential airborne infectious disease transmission. 
The full text of each selected publication was obtained 
and evaluated. 
We adopted the following definitions: an infection with 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis was evidenced by a posi-
tive tuberculin skin test (TST) reaction and/or a posi-
tive interferon-gamma release assay (IGRA) without 
any sign of clinically or radiologically manifest disease. 
Active tuberculosis was defined by bacteriologically, 
histologically or radiologically confirmed active dis-
ease. Measles was diagnosed through testing of serum 
specimens for measles-specific IgM and IgG antibodies 
using an enzyme immunoassay: persons who were IgM 
positive were defined to have a recent measles infec-
tion. A classical measles case was defined as a person 
who meets the clinical case definition and/or meets the 
serological criteria [9]. Mild or asymptomatic measles 
was defined as a recent measles infection indicated by 
the presence of measles IgM, but who did not meet the 
clinical case definition [10-12]. Meningococcal disease 
was evidenced through culture of blood and cerebro-




Our ‘all fields’ search identified a total of 21,764 hits. 
After screening abstracts and/or titles, 72 potentially 
relevant publications were identified for full-text 
evaluation. Finally, 15 publications were selected. All 
selected publications describe CT. Of the selected pub-
lications, all but one reported disease transmission in 
buses; the other described a combined trip by bus and 
train, but CT focussed solely on the passengers who 
travelled by train [13]. In total, 14 events, dating from 
1961 to 2008, were included in our study (the same 
event was described by two publications). No relevant 
publication was found reporting on airborne infectious 
disease transmission in a tram or metro/underground/
subway. Of the 14 events related to airborne infectious 
disease transmission followed by CT in ground trans-
port, 11 events were on TB, two on meningococcal dis-
ease and one on measles. Three reported on singular 
exposure during single trips and 11 on events related to 
cumulative exposure during repeated trips.   
Single-trip exposure
Event 1, TB in train trip
A combined single bus and multiple train trips taken 
in January 1996 by a 22 year-old male index case 
with bilateral cavitation, cough and haemoptysis 
in the United States was reported, but CT was only 
undertaken for passengers who travelled by train 
[13]. The train journeys lasted 29.1 hours (12.3 hours 
from Chicago to Pittsburgh, and 16.8 hours from 
Washington, DC, to Florida). The median duration of 
travel by co-passengers was 12.3 hours (range: 1–34.7 
hours). The train operator provided a list of passen-
gers and crew-members; the telephone number was 
the only available contact information. Passengers and 
crew members were notified via telephone (to obtain 
addresses) and by recorded delivery. A total of 76.8% 
of passengers (368/479) could be located and 50.1% of 
persons (240/479) were evaluated: 15 of 240 persons 
(6.3%) seroconverted; of the 15, two developed active 
disease. The possibility of more extensive transmis-
sion could not be excluded. 
Event 2, TB in bus trip
In a single bus trip in Spain from Malaga to the Sierra 
Nevada in March 1998 [14], the index case was an 18 
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year-old male student with active TB, but without cavi-
tations. Including the bus driver, 53 persons travelled 
on the bus. Two of three teachers became infected. Of 
the 49 students, 41 were traced: 19 seroconverted. Of 
these 19, five developed active disease. In total, there 
were 21 secondary cases. Through multivariate analy-
sis, bus exposure was identified as an independent 
risk factor for TST reactivity (attributable risk: 15.9%). 
Event 3, measles in bus trip
A study in the United States investigated the frequency 
of mild or asymptomatic measles infections of persons 
exposed to a student with measles during a three-day 
bus trip in May 1996 involving two buses [15]. On the 
first day of the trip, one student became ill with clini-
cal signs of classic measles, which was subsequently 
confirmed by serological studies. The exposed persons 
travelled on the two buses and could interact with per-
sons on the other bus at other times, such as during 
meals, visits to museums and at rest stops.  Most per-
sons travelled on the same bus throughout the trip. 
The results demonstrated that mild or asymptomatic 
measles infections can occur in previously immune 
populations. A total of 94 persons participated in the 
trip: for the investigation, 45 persons agreed to partici-
pate in the study. None of the participants developed 
classic measles symptoms. However, 10 persons were 
IgM positive for measles, probably arising from expo-
sure to the index case.
The outcome from the CT following exposure to TB or 
measles during a single trip are summarised in Table 1.
Repeated trip exposure
Event 4, TB in bus trip 
As part of an investigation of a school- and commu-
nity-based TB outbreak in late 1992 in northern Italy, 
independent risk factors for TST were analysed by mul-
tivariate analysis for students travelling in the same 
bus as the index patient [16]. The index patient was an 
18 year-old student with active disease (cavitations). 
Out of 212 contact persons tested, 70 (33.0%) sero-
converted. The adjusted odds ratio (OR) for classroom 
contact was at 4.4 (95% CI: 3.4–5.7) and for living in 
the same town was 4.8 (95% CI: 3.8–6.0). The OR was 
highest for travelling on the bus with the index patient: 
5.4 (95% CI: 4.3–6.7). The attack rates for the bus pas-
sengers in relation to the duration of travel are shown 
in Table 2.
Event 5, TB in bus trip
CT was carried out after transmission of TB on a school 
bus in 1998 in the United States [18]. The nine year-
old index case with bilateral cavitation travelled on 
the school bus for 90 minutes each morning; the co-
passengers were exposed between 35 and 75 minutes 
daily. Out of 32 school bus contacts, 10 seroconverted; 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Event 6, TB in bus trip
A brief report described transmission of TB on a school 
bus in April 2007 in the United Kingdom; however, the 
daily duration of the bus trip was not mentioned [19]. 
The cumulative mean duration of exposure of students 
to the index case, a smear-positive 46 year-old bus 
driver, exceeded 24 hours. Transmission from the bus 
driver was extensive: 18 of the 33 students had a posi-
tive IGRA; among those, four children developed active 
TB.
Event 7, TB in bus trip
In the United States in 2001, of 33 passengers in a 
school bus exposed to the index case, 18 serocon-
verted. The index case was a 15 year-old student with 
cavitation. One of the seroconverted contacts devel-
oped active disease [20]. There was daily exposure 
of the contacts to the index case, but the duration of 
exposure was not discussed.
Event 8, TB in bus trip
In the United States in 1985, of 29 students exposed to 
the index case, a 13 year-old student with cavitation, 
17 seroconverted; however, there was exposure in the 
school choir, school bus and the school itself [21]. Of 
the 17 students who seroconverted, eight had no other 
direct or indirect contact with the index patient other 
than on the school bus. The duration of exposure of the 
contacts to the index case during the bus trips was not 
discussed.
Event 9, TB in bus trip
CT was carried out after transmission of TB in a 
Japanese commuter bus in 1999 as a result of cumu-
lative exposure to the index case through repeated 
trips to the workplace [22]. The index case was a 22 
year-old woman without cavitation who worked as 
an employee of an electronics company. Of the 49 
commuters exposed to the index case, five serocon-
verted. However, the study did not exclude workplace 
contacts. 
Event 10, TB in bus trip
Two publications dating from 1962 reported on the 
same event in the United States: CT was undertaken 
after transmission of TB from a school bus driver (with-
out cavitation) to students during daily trips [17,23]. Of 
266 exposed passengers, 85 (32.0%) seroconverted. In 
children riding less than 10 minutes per trip, 8 of 37 
had a TST conversion. In children riding 40–49 minutes 
per trip, 7 of 14 children seroconverted, whereas in 
children following a travel time of at least 50 minutes 
per trip, 10 of 16 seroconverted [17] (Table 2).
Event 11, TB in bus trip
Between November 1994 and April 1995, students in 
two counties in New York were exposed to five school 
bus drivers with pulmonary TB [24].  A relative risk of 
39.3 (95% CI: 8.8–174.8) for a positive TST was sig-
nificant only in students exposed to driver 3. A total 
of 101 students exposed to driver 3 were screened: 17 
were defined as close contacts; of those, 11 were TST 
positive. There was no clear evidence of transmission 
of M. tuberculosis to students from drivers 1, 2, 4 or 5. 
No student was potentially exposed to more than one 
driver. However, evidence suggests that driver 3 trans-
mitted TB not only to students, but also to bus driver 4, 
who developed active disease. Drivers 3 and 4 worked 
for the same bus company and often sat together in 
the closed bus of driver 3 while waiting for students to 
leave school and enter their buses. M. tuberculosis iso-
lates of driver 3 and 4 were indistinguishable by DNA 
fingerprinting.
Event 12, TB in bus trip 
A TB outbreak in an Alabama high school in the United 
States in 1969 led to CT of 379 persons: of 27 students 
Table 2
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who travelled on the school bus with the index case, 
22 seroconverted. The index case was a 17 year-old 
male in the 11th grade (ages 16–17 years). Six of the 
10 positive reactors in grades 7 to 9 (12–13 years to 
14–15 years) rode the bus, but only 11 of the 67 positive 
reactors in grades 10 to 12 (15–16 years to 17–18 years) 
were bus riders. The school bus riders thus accounted 
for a much larger proportion of the positive reactors in 
grades 7–9 than they did in grades 10–12. The contact 
of the students from grades 7–9 with the index case 
was largely limited to travel on the school bus, which 
was poorly ventilated [25].
Results from CT following exposure to TB on repeated 
bus trips (events 4–12) are summarised in Table 3.
Event 13, meningococcal disease in bus trip 
A letter to the editor described the transmission of 
Neisseria meningitidis (serogroup B) to two of 132 co-
passengers (1.5%) in a crowded school bus in Australia 
in June 2005. All co-passengers were successfully 
traced [26]. 
Event 14, meningococcal disease in bus trip 
In the course of a study in the United States on the 
effect of influenza to predispose towards meningococ-
cal disease in 1986, five of 72 students were found to 
have developed meningococcal disease following expo-
sure to the index case in a school bus [27]. The aver-
age amount of time spent on the bus the previous two 
weeks was 8 hours 4 minutes (cumulative) for each of 
the five affected children. The students had assigned 
seats and generally used the same seat each day. All 
five students reported influenza-like symptoms around 
5-15 days (mean: 10.6 days) before the development 
of meningococcal disease. Results from CT following 
exposure to meningococcal disease on repeated trips 
on school buses (events 13 and 14) are summarised in 
Table 4.
Non-scientific literature
Our search of non-scientific literature yielded 55,325 
hits. This search was complementary to the scien-
tific literature search to detect information on events 
that might not be reflected in the scientific literature. 
Non-scientific sources, in the absence of any scientific 
peer-review process, cannot be given equal standing 
with the scientific literature.  Nevertheless, it seemed 
important to check for reports in other sources given 
the low number of scientific publications. Of the first 
200 hits from each keyword combination with each 
search engine, 34 potentially relevant reports were 
identified. Of these, we selected 17 publications dating 
from 1998 to 2008 on eight events – either descriptive 
reports of the incident followed by CT or press releases 
produced as part of a CT strategy. They described the 
potential transmission of TB, meningococcal disease, 
SARS or rubella during bus or railway trips. No publica-
tions on transmission of airborne infectious diseases 
in metros and trams were found. Only one event (event 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[28,29] was also picked up by the scientific literature 
search [19].
TB in bus trips
Eight publications describe three events linked to 
transmission of TB as a result of bus travel. Two of 
those publications report on transmission of TB from 
a bus driver to students in the United Kingdom [28,29]. 
This event was also reported in the scientific literature 
(event 6) [19]. One of the publications describes the 
exposure to a bus driver infected with TB in a school 
bus in the United States [30]. Both school bus events 
are related to repeated bus trips. Five of the publi-
cations are dedicated to two different incidents in 
Canada concerning single-trip exposure to TB in a long-
distance travel bus [31-35].
SARS in railway trip
Two publications discuss one event in a train linked to 
the SARS outbreak in Canada in 2003 [36,37]. 
Meningococcal disease in railway trips
Six publications in German newspapers describe the 
occurrence of meningococcal disease related to rail-
way trips in 1998 and 2008. In 1998, three publications 
reported on a case of meningococcal disease on a train: 
an 18 year-old student became symptomatic on a rail-
way trip from Rome (Italy) to Munich (Germany) [38-40]. 
On transit through Austria, co-passengers received 
post-exposure prophylaxis. On arrival in Germany, the 
train was stopped and put under quarantine. The pub-
lications did not mention whether or not the index case 
transmitted the disease to co-passengers on the train. 
We also selected three publications from 2008 on 
exposure to an 18 year-old Swiss student with menin-
gococcal disease travelling by train from Zurich 
(Switzerland) to Berlin (Germany) [41-43]: two of the 
publications were released as part of a CT media strat-
egy: persons potentially in contact with the index case 
were invited to contact their local health department 
[41,43]. This event was also reported in the scientific 
literature [44]; however, it was not picked up by our 
scientific literature search, since disease transmission 
was not evident.
Rubella in bus trip
We selected a publication on CT in 2008 of 700 poten-
tially exposed persons to a woman infected with rubella 
in a shuttle bus in the United States [45]. The woman 
commuted to work not knowing that she was infected. 
Environmental factors potentially 
influencing the risk of pathogen transmission 
in public ground conveyances
Of the 15 selected scientific publications, 11 contain 
information on potential environmental risk factors 
such as poor ventilation, closed ventilation systems 
and proximity to the index case [13,14,16,17,19,22-27]. 
The scientific publications related to the events 3, 5, 
7, and 8 and the selected non-scientific publications 
do not provide information on environmental factors 
related to pathogen transmission. 
A study related to the combined bus and train trip 
(event 1) in 1996 in the United States describes the 
air circulation on the train as an air-conditioning sys-
tem with filter [13]. The air exchange rate was 10–15 
times per hour and filters were changed every 15 days. 
Windows could not be opened in any of the carriages. 
Each train was composed of coach cars (at least one 
sleeper car and one dining car). Interviews with the 
passengers and index TB patient indicated that trans-
mission resulted rather from brief contact (face-to-face 
contact or when seated near the ill passenger while he 
was dining and speaking) than from extended sharing 
of train airspace. With the exception of a brief stay in 
the dining car, the index case remained seated in his 
assigned seat. The passenger had several episodes of 
haemoptysis, covered his mouth with the hood of his 
jacket when coughing and avoided contact with other 
passengers [13]. 
Related to a single-trip exposure of passengers to TB 
(event 2), poor ventilation (windows closed, no air con-
ditioning) due to low outside temperature was reported 
as a factor potentially influencing transmission [14]. In 
total 21 persons were infected (19 students and two 
teachers). Of the 19 infected students, 10 were sitting 
no more than two rows away from the index case [14].
The TB outbreak in northern Italy (event 4) highlights 
that those students getting on the bus carrying the 
index case at the stops closer to the final destination 
were crowded in the bus aisles [16]. Crowding was seen 
as a potential factor influencing the transmission of 
disease in the study on an outbreak of meningococcal 
disease (event 13) in a school bus [26]. The publication 
on event 14, reports on assigned seats for students (in 
general they sat in the same seat each day) in a school 
bus within the frame of CT related to meningococcal 
disease after an influenza respiratory infection [27]. 
The TB outbreak in an Alabama high school in 1969 
(event 12) with high transmission rates especially in 
school bus passengers was related to poor ventilation 
of the bus [25]. The report of transmission of TB in a 
Japanese commuter bus (event 9) described a closed 
recirculation system with insufficient ventilation [22]. 
In event 6, a high transmission rate of TB was also 
linked to a closed ventilation system, combined with a 
heating system that blew hot air toward the infectious 
driver and then into the rest of the bus [19]. 
In the report from 1962 of event 10, there was a 
detailed description of the environment of a bus in 
which TB was transmitted extensively from a school 
bus driver to students [17]. The bus was equipped with 
two fan heaters, one situated to the left beside the bus 
driver and the other midway in the bus. There was a 
defroster at the base of the windscreen and two fans 
were installed (one on either side of and directed at the 
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windscreen). When in use, those would move air from 
the front to the rear of the bus.
An investigation on CT related to bus drivers with pul-
monary TB (event 11) provides some information on 
potential environmental factors [24]. Even though the 
extent of ventilation in all buses was not known, it was 
seen as likely that the windows were closed due to win-
tertime. However, according to the school policy, the 
driver (with pulmonary TB) was not allowed to let the 
children off when the bus had arrived early. Therefore, 
the children waited on the bus with the driver for 15–20 
minutes (in addition to a trip duration of 25–35 min-
utes), during which time the windows remained closed. 
This may have contributed to prolonged cumulative 
exposure of the students in a poorly ventilated envi-
ronment. No information concerning the seating of the 
children on the buses was provided. It was not possi-
ble to draw any conclusion regarding seat position and 
exposure. 
Discussion and conclusions
Our review of the scientific literature revealed 14 events 
(15 publications) of documented human-to-human 
transmission of airborne infectious disease related to 
public ground transport.  Most of the scientific publica-
tions we selected report on transmission of TB, a few 
on meningococcal disease and one on measles: reports 
on transmission of other pathogens are lacking. In our 
review we address various factors potentially influ-
encing disease transmission such as length of expo-
sure, proximity to index case and type of ventilation. 
Complementary to the review of scientific literature, we 
conducted a web-based search of non-scientific litera-
ture in order to ensure a broader search and to assess 
the potential for publication bias. Through the non-sci-
entific literature search we identified eight events, two 
of which were reported in the scientific literature, but 
only one of them [19] was picked up by our scientific 
literature search.
Close to half a billion citizens in the 27 countries of 
the European Union enjoy access to various means of 
transportation [1]. Given the large number of passen-
gers travelling by public ground transport, the num-
ber of reported incidents appears to be very low [1,2]. 
The anonymous nature of contact between passengers 
makes it unlikely that an infectious disease diagnosed 
after a trip will trigger warnings or investigations with 
reference to travel-related exposure, unless unusual 
circumstances such as ‘dramatic’ illness (e.g. loss of 
consciousness in meningococcal disease) are involved. 
The lack of evidence of disease transmission related 
to use of public ground transport and the lack of guid-
ance documents may be reasons for the limited num-
ber of publications in this field. 
The World Health Organization guidelines for air travel 
recommend CT of passengers exposed to people with 
pulmonary TB who sat in adjacent rows for longer than 
eight hours (including ground delays) [46,47]. These 
guidelines refer to single trips whereas in public ground 
transport, repeated (daily) and short trips to and from 
school or the workplace, for example, also take place. 
Cumulative exposure related to repeated bus trips can 
lead to high transmission rates of TB and to transmis-
sion of meningococcal disease. We identified reports 
describing an association between the duration of 
exposure to TB through repeated trips and seroconver-
sion in contact persons (Table 2): generally speaking, 
the longer the travel duration, the higher the rate of 
seroconversion [16,17]. 
Environmental characteristics such as space and 
air (re)circulation may influence the risk of disease 
transmission. It is known that droplet nuclei may be 
transported through ventilation systems, as has been 
documented for TB [48]. Indoors, bacilli are potentially 
trapped, disperse within a room, and may remain via-
ble and suspended in the air for a prolonged period of 
time [49-52]. Dilution of infectious particles through 
local air circulation and overall room ventilation can 
direct exposure into spaces that were not even visited 
by the index patient [53-56]. Comprehensive informa-
tion on factors potentially influencing the risk of dis-
ease transmission is lacking for travel in public ground 
conveyances. Detailed information on ventilation and 
air circulation has been given in two publications: 
however, the factors were not systematically evaluated 
[17,19]. Given the low number of publications dedicated 
to infectious disease transmission and ventilation sys-
tems, we included studies dating back to the 1960s 
when air conditioning systems were not commonly 
in use on buses.  Findings based upon older studies 
might therefore not be applicable to newer systems.
Crowding of passengers in public or school buses 
may act as a triggering factor on the transmission of 
TB and meningococcal disease [16,26]. Transmission 
through brief but intensive contact has been described 
for TB [57-62]. In a cohort study with a random sample 
of 142 commuters on the association between public 
commuter transport in Peru and pulmonary TB in work-
ers, the authors concluded that the use of minibuses 
increased the risk of pulmonary TB due to overcrowd-
ing, cumulative exposure to persons with productive 
coughs while commuting twice daily five days a week, 
closed windows on minibuses, combined with a high 
prevalence of pulmonary TB [63]. Furthermore, persons 
with pulmonary TB have more productive coughs in the 
mornings, hence increasing the risk for transmission 
of TB to other passengers presumably during morning 
travel [64], as has already been suggested by other 
studies in developing and industrialised countries 
[16,65,66]. While it is recognised that overcrowding 
in confined spaces increases the risk of transmission, 
this risk has not been quantified [64]. Not only in set-
tings such as public transport, the relation between 
overcrowding, duration of exposure including cumu-
lative exposure, ventilation and other environmental 
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characteristics and disease transmission remains 
poorly understood.
CT after potential disease transmission in public 
ground transport is hampered by logistic hurdles. The 
follow-up of passengers, especially in urban settings, 
is unfeasible or, at best, limited since passenger data 
(e.g. name, telephone number, email address), in met-
ros, trams and short-distance bus trips are mostly not 
collected. Anonymous transport seems to be one of the 
main hurdles for the initiation of CT. If passenger data 
are indeed collected, limited storage, lack of useful 
data, transport company policies and accessibility of 
data may be further obstacles. 
In national long-distance or international railway or 
bus trips, passenger data may also not be collected 
routinely. We identified only one scientific publication 
where CT was performed on the basis of passenger 
lists for a single railway trip [13]. Without passen-
ger data, CT has to rely on media appeals to inform 
potentially affected co-passengers. A case of invasive 
meningococcal disease with fatal outcome in a Swiss 
student visiting Berlin (Germany) on a class trip by 
train in 2008 demonstrates the ability to identify con-
tacts in an anonymous transport system [44]. Since no 
passenger data were collected, it was decided to per-
form CT through a press release informing the public 
about meningococcal disease. It also asked the woman 
who had travelled in the same train compartment as 
the patient to contact the local health department to 
receive chemoprophylaxis, which she did. 
Contact investigations require a substantial amount of 
financial and human resources. In none of the retrieved 
studies was the cost of CT provided nor was the effec-
tiveness of interventions to prevent the transmission 
of infectious diseases evaluated. Concerning air travel, 
two publications report on the cost of investigations 
related to the estimated number of passengers with 
TB [67,68]. The authors concluded that in the case of 
TB, contact investigations in aircrafts are highly inef-
ficient. Nevertheless, CT in air travel receives a high 
level of attention, which is reflected in international 
regulations and recommendations [46,47]. Taking into 
account the substantial logistic hurdles, it seems likely 
that CT after exposure to infectious diseases in public 
ground transport is inefficient. 
All selected contact investigations attempted to dis-
criminate between contact persons infected while trav-
elling with the index case and transmission in other 
settings, e.g. schools or workplaces. Some investiga-
tions may demonstrate stronger evidence than oth-
ers: in some, contacts were clearly limited to a bus 
since the index case was a bus driver [17,19,24], while 
other reports identified bus transport as an independ-
ent risk factor through multivariate analysis [14,16]. 
Conclusions that can be drawn from most of the identi-
fied CT investigations are limited by the small number 
of exposed individuals. A few publications, however, 
provide some evidence due to a relatively high number 
of tested contact persons [13,16,17]. 
Evidence on transmission of infectious diseases is 
limited by the quantity and quality of the reported CT 
studies. The publications we selected describe obser-
vational studies, which lack a control group and an 
attempt to minimise bias. Most of the investigations we 
selected were related to cumulative exposure in school 
buses where CT was obviously feasible. Only three rel-
evant publications on single-trip exposure were found. 
Further we could locate only one publication describing 
CT following a railway trip [13]. The transmission rates 
may underestimate or conversely overestimate the 
actual transmission rates since not all contact persons 
were traced. Concerning the only publication on CT fol-
lowing travel of a TB case on a single railway trip, the 
train operator’s records allowed 77% of all passengers 
on the trip to be located. However, only 49% of located 
passengers were evaluated, hence the possibility of 
more extensive transmission cannot be excluded. 
The lack of evidence on disease transmission in pub-
lic ground transport as well as logistic hurdles related 
to CT may be the main reasons for the limited number 
of relevant publications we could identify. We assume 
that transmission of airborne infectious diseases in 
public ground transport takes place but does not result 
in scientific publications, or reports do exist but have 
not been published. Thus the risk of infectious disease 
transmission as well as the public health impact of 
transmission of airborne communicable diseases dur-
ing travel in railways or buses/coaches remains largely 
unknown. Even though the risk of infectious disease 
transmission in ground transport may be higher than 
in air transport, our investigations did not gener-
ate evidence that transmission of infectious diseases 
in public ground transport is an issue of great public 
health importance. Taking into account the logistic hur-
dles and probably limited effectiveness of CT, we con-
clude that only circumstances such as dramatic illness 
or organised trips would justify CT in public ground 
transport. This contrasts with the high profile CT of air 
passengers has in international regulations and rec-
ommendations and raises the question whether indi-
cations for CT should be revisited after a risk– benefit 
assessment and a comprehensive analysis taking into 
account exposures in both ground and air transport.
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